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Abstract 
Insider trading has been a major issue for stock markets and investor protection. In order to avoid problems of information 
asymmetry all countries have implemented regulations, forcing insiders to provide information concerning selling or purchasing 
shares of their firms. In this paper we examine the effect of these corporate announcements have on stock prices of companies in 
the Athens Stock Exchange technology sector, by using event study analysis methodology. 14 listed firms of the technology 
sector has been examined and a total of 636 announcements has been analysed. We found that purchasing transactions do not 
affect abnormal stock returns and stock prices, while selling transactions have a positive effect prior to the announcement and 
negative afterwards. The existence of a weak form of market efficiency can be assumed as announcements has not affected 
significantly and persistently stock prices and abnormal returns. 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICOAE 2015. 
Keywords: Insider Trading; Efficient Market Hypothesis; Corporate Governance;  
1. Introduction 
The rise of capital markets around the world and the corporate governance issues that were raised, forced all 
countries to implement disclosure regulations for significant actions and decisions taken by listed firms. For stock 
markets to operate efficiently investors must be able to have access to all available financial information related to 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel+30 24610 68221. 
E-mail address: iantoniadis@teiwm.gr 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICOAE 2015.
61 I. Antoniadis et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  24 ( 2015 )  60 – 67 
firms and markets so that they will be able to take rational decisions concerning their investments. In his seminal 
work  Fama (1970) defined a market to be “informationally efficient” if prices at each moment incorporate all 
available information about future values. Disclosure of information for insiders’ actions who have access to critical 
information  and competences (Trivellas and Reklitis , 2014) is therefore of utmost importance, for the protection of 
shareholders and investors (Lazaridis et al, 2008), and is legally mandatory in almost every country of the world. 
A significant trend in research concerns the way that markets and investors react upon the announcement of a 
corporate related event, such as mergers and acquisitions (Drympetas and Kyriazopoulos, 2014), earning 
announcements, corporate deals etc.), therefore affecting the stock prices of the firm. An important category of 
events is the announcement by a firm of the buying or selling shares by insiders, as they have access to privilege 
information concerning the firm, and her financial and operational performance. The question we have to ask 
however is whether the announcement of financial transactions of insiders affects the stock price of their firm.  
Insider trading has been an important issue for academics, practitioners and regulators around the world, as it is a 
clear example of how asymmetric information may result to the loss of shareholder wealth. Despite the fact that 
there is enough evidence for the US and the UK stock market (anglo-saxon corporate governance systems) only 
recently this issue has drawn research attention for other countries (Leledakis et al. 2010), and especially countries 
that fall in the continental system of corporate governance.  
In this paper the effect that financial transactions of insiders of listed firms in the Greek Technology sector (and 
most specifically for the hardware and software firms) of the Athens Stock Exchange Market (ATHEX), in the share 
prices of the firms are examined. In order to achieve that goal an event study is conducted for 636 announcements of 
insider trading of 14 software and hardware firms listed in ATHEX during the period 2007-2013. The aim of this 
paper is to explore the relationship between announcement of insider trading and the existence of a strong or semi 
strong form of market efficiency in the sector. In order to achieve this goal abnormal returns are calculated using the 
event study methodology, and the statistical importance is evaluated with the use of both parametrical and non 
parametrical statistical tests of cumulative abnormal returns in order to find support for the efficient market 
hypothesis.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the technology sector in ATHEX, and insider 
trading disclosure regulation in Greece. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature on insider trading and the effect it 
has on stock prices. Section 4 describes the data and the event study methodology used in this paper. In section 5 the 
results are presented and discussed and finally section 6 concludes the paper and offer suggestion for further 
research.    
2. The Technology sector in the ATHEX and insider trading information regulation in Greece. 
   The technology firms in Athens Stock Exchange market included corporations operating in 
Telecommunications, Hardware and Software, and Internet services. The sector had 24 firms listed in 2007, a 
number that dropped to 20 in 2013, where 5 of them are in surveillance status and 2 of them are under deletion 
status. For the period examined 14 software and hardware firms were listed in the main market of ATHEX   
The technology sector was severely affected by the financial crisis that loomed Greece since 2009, along with the 
rest of the ATHEX market, losing almost 80% of its value, as it can be seen in Figure 1. The turnover of the market 
sector both in terms of volume and number of transactions, also plummeted.  
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Figure 1. The Technology Market Sector of ATHEX (2007-2014) 
 
The fundamentals of the technology firms were also deeply affected by the financial crisis in 2009. After a period 
of sales increase from 2004 to 2009 to a maximum of approximately 2.23 bn.€, turnover dropped by 14.8% to 
1.90bn € in 2013. The same was true for the total assets of the firms that dropped by approximately 31.1% from 3.70 
bn. € in 2007 to 2.55 bn. € in 2013. 
  Regulating the disclosure of insider trading is very important for the development of stock markets. 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) found that that the cost of equity in a country (after controlling for risk factors, a 
liquidity factor, and other shareholder rights) may be reduced by about 5% if insider trading laws are enforced. 
Notwithstanding the importance of insider trading, it was only until recently that European countries had established 
regulations to ensure disclosure. For example, Germany has introduced disclosure regulation for insider trading and 
transactions in 2002 (Dickgiesser and Kaserer 2009).  
The legal and regulatory framework for corporate governance and disclosure of insider trading information in 
Greece has been in place since 2002 (L.3016/2002) and 2005 (L. 3340/2005, Article 13) respectively incorporating 
significant European Union legislation. Corporate Officers, board members, employees in crucial financial positions 
in the firms, Shareholders owning a significant block of share, as well as closely related to these people individuals 
and organisations are considered as insiders that have to disclose specified information concerning transactions of 
shares.  
The regulatory framework apart from the the persons who are considered to be insiders clearly states in 
conjunction with the Decision 3/347/12.7.2005 of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) the relevant 
data that must be disclosed, and defines who are the relevant persons (insiders), that are obliged to disclose their 
transactions. In 2007 a new law was introduced (L. 3556/2007, Article 9), along with the Decision 1/434/3.7.2007 of 
the HCMC,  extending the definition of insiders to blockholders should there was a significant change in the 
percentage of shares they were holding, and also defining the means this information should be disseminated to the 
public (Article 21).   
3. Literature Review. 
Roddenberry and Bacon (2011), offered an broad description of insider trading” “as the act of buying or selling a 
corporation’s stock or other securities by an individual with potential access to non-public information about the 
company”. Regulating the disclosure of insider trading, provide protection to shareholders and investors as, non-
disclosed insider transactions, undermine market’s trust, and can lead to significant decrease of shareholders’ wealth 
(Hamill et al, 2002), as insiders sell or buy shares of their firms either to gain additional liquidity or because they are 
in possession of internal confidential and not disclosed information. Therefore, as Bainbridge (1999) sets it 
“prohibiting insider trading is usually justified on fairness or equity grounds”, providing sound arguments for 
regulating insider trading. 
The importance of insider trading has been outlined in numerous studies. Since the seminal papers of Jaffe (1974) 
and Finnerty (1976) a number of studies has shown that significant abnormal returns of insiders are associated both 
with purchase and sale transactions, and also found support by more resent studies (Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Betzer 
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and Theissen, 2008). According to Allen and Ramanan (2005) in many cases investors tend to mimic insider trading 
when they are disclosed, as the market perceives these transactions as long term signals for the prospects of the firm, 
resulting to changes in stock prices and firm value. Del Brio et al. (2002), found that insiders can achieve higher 
abnormal returns based on undisclosed information, while, in accordance with Hamill et all. (2002), shareholders’ 
returns are below normal if based on available disclosed information. Gregory et al (2009) showed that insiders 
demonstrate good market timing, as they buy (sell) shares after the decrease (increase) of stock prices, and also 
found support for the information hierarchy hypothesis.  
The efficient market hypothesis has been examined thoroughly for the ATHEX. Stengos and Panas E. (1992) 
found evidence for the existence of weak and semi-strong forms of market efficiency, in the Greek banking sector of 
ATHEX, after controlling for the existence of non-linearity on the stock prices return using cointegration analysis. 
Niarchos and Alexakis  (1998) also tested the efficient market hypothesis for the ATHEX using causality tests. Their 
results rejected the efficient market hypothesis, finding a weak form. Their results were backed by Kavussanos and 
Dockery (2001), and Patra and Poshakwale (2008). 
 Notwithstanding the importance of insider trading little research has been conducted for the Greek stock market. 
Thalasinos et al. (2012), recognizing the importance of monitoring insider trading announcements developed a 
platform, capable of receiving and analysing information using the event study methodology.  The research of 
Leledakis et al (2010) stands out. Using the event study methodology, they examined market’s reaction of the 
ATHEX to the announcements of insider trading for the period 2000-2005. Their results showed the market is 
affected positively by announcements of stock purchases, and negatively in the case of selling announcements, 
during the period of two days before of the announcements and to one or two days after the announcements. These 
result indicate the existence of a strong form of market efficiency as information seems to be incorporated in stock 
prices almost immediately in the buying announcements. In both cases these findings reject the market timing 
trading shown by Gregory et al. (2009). Following the above literature review the aim of this paper is to examine 
both the effect that insider trading has in share prices and the validity of the efficient market hypothesis in the 
ATHEX, focusing in the technology sector. 
4. Data and Methodology 
In order to examine the effect the announcements of insider trading to the stock prices and the returns of the 
technology firms examined the event study methodology is used (Brown and Warner, 1985; Campbell 1997:pp.149; 
Binder 1989). The sample used consists of 14 computer software and hardware firms of  ATHEX and the released 
announcements of insider trading for the period 2007-2013. The announcements concern selling and buying of 
shares by relevant persons as these are defined by the legal framework analysed in Section 2, excluding changes of 
voting rights of corporations and other organisations. The announcements were found by the official web page of the 
ATHEX ( www.helex.gr ) and more specifically the pages concerning the announcements of listed firms. In Table 1 
are presented the number of a buy and sell announcements, as a total, and in terms of the identity of the relevant 
person. A total number of 636 events were identified, after excluding non statistical important events. 
     Table 1. Number of Observations . 
 CEO BoD 
members 
Executives Non 
Executives 
Independent 
members 
Total 
Buying stocks 350 125 23 71 1 498 
Selling Stocks 46 76 16 15 0 138 
Total number of events 396 201 49 86 1 636 
 
The majority of the transactions were conducted by the CEOs, and Board of Directors members. Executives of 
the firm are employees of the firm and non executive members are person related to the company and relevant 
persons but not employed by the firm. Finally, independent members are by law prohibited to own shares of the firm 
that they sit on her Board. 
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 In order to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for every event, the adjusted market model of 
McKinlay (1997), was used. The beta coefficient for the return of each stock is estimated in relation to the market 
returns of the General Index of the ATHEX market. The event window is set around the day t=0 which is the 
announcement of the transaction. The event window calculated is maximum t [-20 , +20] days and smaller event 
windows following the methodology of Leledakis et al. (2010). In order to calculate the beta coefficient for every 
event the estimation window used was 160 days [-180, -21]. Expected returns and beta coefficients are then 
calculated by estimating equation (1), using the OLS method: 
,    (1)  
where at time t: Rit is the actual return of the stock i, Rmt is the return of the market,  αi, bi are the coefficients of 
the OLS model and εit is the zero disturbance term with E(εit)=0 and Var(εit)=σεit2.  
 
The following step is to calculate Abnormal Returns (ARit) that are estimated as the difference of expected return 
for time t, and actual returns of the stock i for time t as follows in equation (1): 
 
  (2) 
where ,  ܽǡෝ  ෠ܾ, are the estimates for the coefficients αi bi,  
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are then calculated as the sum of all abnormal returns for each firm (ARit) 
during the event window where t [t1, t2]. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) are also calculated. 
ܥܣܴ௜ǡሺି௧భǡ௧మሻ ൌ σ ܣܴ௜௧௧మ௧ୀି௧భ   ,     (3) 
ܥܣܣܴ௜ǡሺି௧భǡ௧మሻ ൌ  ଵே σ ܥܣܴ௜௧
௧మ௧ୀି௧భ ,  (4) 
where t1 is the number of trading days before the event (t0) and t2 is the number of trading days after the event 
(t0). 
 
After calculating CAR and CAAR, the statistical significance of these values is estimated with parametric and non 
parametric test. According to the parametric test proposed by MacKinlay (1997), coefficient t is calculated for every 
event window.   
 
ݐ ൌ  ஼஺஺ோሺ௧భǡ௧మሻඥ௩௔௥ሺ஼஺஺ோሺ௧భǡ௧మሻሻ,  (5)  
where CAAR is the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for the event window (t1,t2) and var(CAAR(t1,t2)) is the 
variance of CAAR. 
 
The statistic t  follows normal distribution N(0,1) and under the null hypothesis cumulative abnormal returns 
equals to zero. Rejection of the null hypothesis demonstrates that the effect of the announcement of the proposal was 
statistically significant, and that it had a significant effect on the stock price of the banks. 
 
The non parametric test applied is the one of Generalized Sign Test (GST) that was proposed by Cowan (1992). 
GST examines whether the number of stocks with positive CAR in the event window estimated exceeds the number 
expected in the absence of abnormal performance.  
 
ݖ ൌ ௪ି௡௣ොඥ௡௣ොሺଵି௣ොሻ , (6) and  ݌Ƹ ൌ
ଵ
௡ σ
ଵ
௠೔
௡௜ୀଵ σ ௜ܵ௧ாషభఴబ௧ୀாషమభ , (7) 
   where mi is the number of the daily abnormal returns for the estimation window (E-180, E-21) for the observation i 
for  day t, and Sit equals to 1 if ARit>0 and 0 if otherwise. 
R i t a i  bi  Rm t H i
65 I. Antoniadis et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  24 ( 2015 )  60 – 67 
5. Empirical Results. 
In Table 2 and 3 the results of the event study for purchase and sales of stocks by insiders are presented, 
respectively. In both Tables CAAR values are reported along with the parametric standardized cross-sectional test (t-
test), and non parametric generalized sign test (GS z-test) for the event windows (-20, +20), (-20, -1), (-10, -1), (0, 
+10), (0, +20), (-3, +3), (-2, +2), (-1, +1), (-2, 0) (-1, 0) (0, +1) and (0, +2) around the event day.  
The results of Table 2 show that there is a negative reaction to announcements concerning insiders buying shares. 
For the period (-20, +20) there is a statistically significant negative price for CAAR of -2.6040%, both by the 
standardized and the generalised sign test. Positive CAAR occur a few days before the announcement and are 
marginally statistically significant using the non parametric test. These result could be indicative of information 
leakage (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Leledakis et al. 2010), however the value of CAAR is significantly low 
(0.0178% for a period of 2 days before the announcement). 
For event periods (-20,-1) and (-10,-1) CAAR is negative and statistically significant as far as the parametric test t 
is concerned. This implies that insiders may time their purchases in order to “support” the share price of their firms, 
or to buy back share at lower prices, strengthening the position they hold in the company.  
 
Table 2. Buying of stocks. 
Event period Number of observations CAAR 
Positive:Negative 
CAR 
CAR standard 
t-test 
Generalized 
Sign 
z-test 
(-20,+20) 498 -2.6040% 216:282 -3.3852*** -2.3736** 
(-3,+3) 498 -0.2178% 257:241 -0.6854 1.3022 
(-2,+2) 498 -0.1238% 260:238 -0.4609 1.5712 
(-1,+1) 498 -0.0746% 262:236 -0.3585 1.7505* 
(-20,-1) 498 -2.3915% 232:266 -4.4514*** -0.9391 
(-10,-1) 498 -1.2940% 248:250 -3.4061*** 0.4953 
(-2,0) 498 0.0178% 266:232 0.0856 2.1091** 
(-1,0) 498 0.0697% 264:234 0.4102 1.9298* 
(0,+10) 498 -0.3075% 262:236 -0.7718 1.7505* 
(0,+20) 498 -0.2125% 246:252 -0.3859 0.3160 
(0,+1) 498 -0.1440% 242:256 -0.8475 -0.0426 
(0,+2) 498 -0.1413% 243:255 -0.6791 0.0471 
* indicates 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level. 
 
Table 3 results suggest that there is a negative reaction of the market towards insiders selling stocks, after the 
announcement.  For the event periods (0,+10) and (0,+20), CAAR is negative (-1.1640% and -1.9161% respectively)   
and statistically significant.  Another very important finding lies in the periods before the the event, namely (-20,-1) 
and (-10,-1).  
Table 3. Selling of stocks. 
Event period Number of observations CAAR 
Positive:Negative 
CAR 
CAR standard 
t-test 
Generalized 
Sign 
z-test 
(-20,+20) 138 0.4087% 66:72 0.3127 -0.0735 
(-3,+3) 138 -0.0365% 67:71 -0.0676 0.0969 
(-2,+2) 138 0.1998% 68:70 0.4377 0.2672 
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(-1,+1) 138 0.1561% 75:63 0.4417 1.4599 
(-20,-1) 138 2.2010% 78:60 2.4111** 1.9709** 
(-10,-1) 138 2.1417% 85:53 3.3181*** 3.1635*** 
(-2,0) 138 0.4391% 76:62 1.2422 1.6302 
(-1,0) 138 0.1962% 76:62 0.6797 1.6302 
(0,+10) 138 -1.1640% 55:83 -1.7194* -1.9475* 
(0,+20) 138 -1.7922% 57:81 -1.9161* -1.6068 
(0,+1) 138 -0.2105% 59:79 -0.7292 -1.2661 
(0,+2) 138 -0.4098% 62:76 -1.1592 -0.7549 
* indicates 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level. 
 
The values of CAAR for these events are positive (+2.2010% and +2.1417% respectively) and statistically 
significant. This suggests that insiders time their transaction to achieve positive abnormal returns, and can be an 
indication of asymmetry of information. It is interesting to note that for the short period close to the announcement, 
namely (-2,0) and (-1,0), CAAR values are positive but statistically not significant. All other event periods are not 
statistically significant.   
From the above results we can assume that there is a weak form of market efficiency as prices do not reflect the 
the effects of the announcement of insider trading regarding to purchasing of stocks. As far as selling stocks is 
concerned there can be only speculation of a semi strong market efficiency form as CAAR values are not 
statistically significant for the event periods (0,+1) and (0,+2) as Roddenberry and Bacon (2011) suggested but for 
the event periods (0,+10) and (0+20)    
6. Conclusions. 
In this paper an event study was conducted on the corporate announcements of insider trading in the software and 
hardware firms of the Greek technology sector in ATHEX, in order to test the relationship between stock prices and 
insider trading and the validity of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Our results cannot provide strong evidence to support a subtle relationship between buying of stocks by insiders, 
and stock prices. Although there has been evidence of a negative relationship for some event periods, the statistical 
tests has not provided support for the existence of either strong or semi-strong form of market efficiency. These 
results are in contradiction with the results of Leledakis et al (2010), Bajo και Petracci (2006), Dickgiesser και 
Kaserer (2009) as far as the relationship between announcement of buying stocks by insiders, and the results of 
Leledakis et al (2010),  Fidrmuc et al (2006) for the existence of a strong or semi-strong form of market hypothesis.  
In the case of announcements of selling stocks by insiders however, the market tend to react negatively not in the 
immediate period of time after the announcement but within 10 days of the announcement. These results confirm the 
findings of Leledakis et al (2010), Bajo και Petracci (2006), Dickgiesser και Kaserer (2009). An interesting finding 
is the good market timing of insiders on selling their stocks prior the announcement, against market trend 
(Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Finally there is no evidence for the market efficiency hypothesis as far as 
announcement of sales after 1 or 2 days after the announcements as suggested by  Roddenberry and Bacon (2011). 
Our findings should be attributed to two facts, firstly market prices has been falling as the result of the financial 
crisis, and secondly the period of time examined has been the period where regulation  announcement of insider 
trading of relevant person were introduced, in contrast to the paper of Leledakis et al. (2010). Another interesting 
implication of our study is the way that market and investors perceive announcements of insiders purchasing shares 
in a bearish market, as non relevant. Future research should focus on including and examining further corporate 
governance variables affecting the information content of announcements, and the behaviour of insiders and their 
decision to sell or buy shares form their firms.  
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